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Understanding Korea’s Saemaul Undong:
Theory, Evidence, and Implication
Sung-Hee Jwa
This study attempts to derive a theory of Saemaul Undong 
(SMU) by identifying its key success factors and to discover its 
policy implications for economic development. The proposed theory 
argues that the success of the SMU was fundamentally driven by 
the government’s strong adherence to the economic discrimination 
(ED) principle of “rewarding high performance and penalizing low 
performance,” which is the basic function of the market. ED is the 
grand principle behind the success of the SMU. This study draws 
upon detailed historical and personal accounts about how the 
SMU was implemented by former President Park Chung Hee to 
show how faithful the SMU was to the ED principle. In addition, 
the study provides a new empirical model to estimate the effect of 
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I. Introduction
Saemaul Undong (SMU) is regarded as the highlight of the economic 
development in Korea. The success story of the SMU has been 
frequently referenced by Korean, as well as foreign, developmental 
economists and has compelled the Korea International Cooperation 
Agency and other international organizations, such as UN, to devote 
a substantial amount of resources into applying SMU experience to 
other countries. Moreover, some academic institutions in Korea attract 
foreign students by establishing SMU-related departments, colleges, or 
graduate schools. Internationally, less developed countries send their 
students and government officials to Korea to learn about the SMU. The 
question is, what tangible results have such efforts, which continued 
for quite some time, brought us?
Despite the increasing number of countries learning about the 
SMU, cases of the SMU becoming a successful national ideological 
reform movement or a catalyst of economic development have not been 
reported. Such absence of concrete results is not limited to the SMU. 
Similar cases of failure are accumulating in almost all fields, including 
economic development strategies or policies. Although efforts have been 
made to disseminate the Korean economic development experience 
around the world, including the SMU, finding countries that have 
brought visible changes by emulating the Korean experience is difficult. 
The above phenomenon is caused by the Korean society and the 
the SMU on economic growth and shows that the SMU had been a 
significant contributor to Korea’s high growth performance during 
the 1970s. One of the main policy implications of the SMU is that 
development and social policies should comply with the ED principle 
by preventing any political influence from working against the ED 
principle for the success and sustainability of those policies. Finally, 
the study argues that the SMU model provides an alternative or 
complementary perspective to the existing community development 
models.
Keywords:  Saemaul Undong (SMU), Self-help spirit, Economic 
discrimination, Economic egalitarianism, Economization 
of politics, Theory of the SMU success, Marketization 
of economy, Park Chung Hee
JEL Classification: B5, D, O, Q1, R1 
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economic academia, not knowing exactly what the success factors of 
the SMU are and why the SMU was successful only during Korea’s 
developmental era. The success of the SMU contrasts with the less than 
expected performance of other similar social reform programs, such as 
the well-known 4-H Movement and National Reconstruction Campaign 
before the SMU. In the foreign context, the tragic results of the Great 
Leap Forward of Mao Zedong in China and North Korea’s Chollima 
Movement come to mind. 
From a broader perspective, we need to ask why and how Korea 
succeeded in economic development with the so-called “heretical” 
policies and strategies, which the mainstream local and foreign 
economics academia were opposed to. For example, when one asks 
what the success factors of the SMU are, the immediate response is “the 
self-help spirit or can-do spirit.” This answer will likewise be cited as 
the driving force behind Korea’s economic development. Although not 
a completely wrong answer, it is less than half-correct. A truly correct 
answer should be able to answer the question, “Why did only people 
in the Korean peninsula in the 1960s and 70s, even excluding the 
Northern part of it, live up to the ideology of self-help and self-reliance, 
building ‘New Villages’ and leading the export drive, when no one else 
did around the world?” Which country would not know that the spirit of 
self-help and self-reliance is critical for the success in life and national 
development? The critical issue here is how we could transform a 
nation into people who help themselves. Which country or society in 
the world would not emphasize the spirit of self-help in textbooks for 
children? What more could we say when the Western world believes in 
the old saying, “God helps those who help themselves?”1 Would people 
easily acquire self-help spirit if a country seeks to educate them on 
such an ideology? Then, which country would fail in initiating the SMU 
or triggering economic development? Until the 1960s, foreign experts in 
economic development agreed that Korea seems to have no future after 
having traveled the rural villages of Korea and seeing the people there 
appearing very lazy, dependent, and far from self-help. Thus, explaining 
how the same country transformed miraculously into an embodiment 
of self-help and self-reliance in only 20 years must not be easy.
1 Samuel Smiles, a British writer and social reformist, became a huge 
sensation by writing the book Self-Help in 1859 and disseminating the 
importance of self-help in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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The suggestion that self-help spirit is important and that such spirit 
produces good results does not explain the factors of success but rather 
describes the success per se. In other words, it is the same as saying 
that good spirit leads to good results, which is a mere tautology—
explaining a certain endogenous result by the endogenous variables 
of the similar level of endogeneity rather than providing a scientific 
explanation of the endogenous result by exogenous (determining) 
variables. Thus, developing countries have difficulties in understanding 
the SMU and learning policy implications or deciding how and what to 
do about such a social reform. Despite knowing what the good results 
are, developing countries go astray since they do not know how to 
achieve those results, such as how to incorporate the self-help spirit 
into peoples’ mindset and change their behavior.
Therefore, the present study aims to derive a theory of the SMU 
success by identifying the success factors of the SMU. Although some 
books and articles (especially in Korean) have been written with the 
same objective, they mostly describe the SMU, such as describing the 
goals and ideology of the SMU, defining the contents taught by SMU 
education, and discussing the SMU plans and outcomes.2 Indeed, 
the usefulness of such descriptive studies should not be disparaged; 
however, their limitations in learning policy implications and passing on 
the success of the SMU are evident. For this reason, the present study 
seeks to complement the existing literature by developing a theory of 
the SMU success, centering on the strategies of inscribing the self-help 
spirit into people’s minds and inducing them to work for the success 
of the SMU rather than simply providing a detailed description of the 
SMU.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly summarizes the 
new theory of economic development (Jwa 2017a) as the theoretical 
framework for understanding the key success features of former 
President Park Chung Hee’s policy paradigm in general and his SMU 
in particular. Section III outlines the brief history of the SMU with its 
background, implementation process, and outcomes. Section IV derives 
a theory of the SMU success  on the basis of the implications of Section 
II and the observations on the key success features of President Park’s 
SMU policies. Section V describes how the original SMU spirit was 
2 A good example in English is Kim (2015).
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tarnished as the SMU was politically distorted since the Fifth Republic 
and thereafter. Section VI reports the results of empirical analysis on 
the effect of the SMU on economic growth. Section VII examines special 
implications of the SMU for economic development policies. Section VIII 
concludes and briefly summarizes the paper.
II.  New Theory of Economic Development: A Framework for 
Discussion
The success factors of Korea’s economic development during her 
developmental era must be first considered prior to discussing the 
success factors of the SMU because the SMU was one of the main 
developmental policies adopted during the era. However, Park Chung 
Hee followed a non-traditional approach; thus, explaining Korea’s 
economic miracle is not easy for the mainstream neoclassical growth 
model or any other traditional approaches. Therefore, a new theory of 
economic development is adopted in this study.3 This theory has general 
implications by explaining not only the condensed Northeast Asian 
development experiences, such as those of Japan, Korea, and China, 
but also the Western extended development experiences. This section 
begins by summarizing the new principles of economic development, 
which is the basic framework for analyzing the success factors of the 
SMU. 
A.  Fundamental Driving Force behind Economic Development: Economic 
Discrimination (ED) by the Market
Mainstream neoclassical economics regards the market as a 
mechanism of resource allocation. The market is interpreted as a 
device that efficiently allocates a given amount of resources to given 
ends. Given the ends, the order of the economy is also fixed. In this 
economy, economic development can only be described as a process 
of increasing the quantity of given outputs through efficient resource 
allocation, for example from 10 wagons to 100 wagons. This process 
is typically viewed as a ten-fold increase in productivity, income, and 
the size and development of the economy. Although such changes are 
3 Detailed discussion on the new theory of economic development can be 
found in Jwa (2006, 2008, 2012, 2017a, 2017b, 2018) and Jwa and Yoon (2004). 
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sensible from a linear perspective, they are far from reality. In reality, 
economic development is not a linear process of changing itself from an 
agrarian society, which produces wagons as a mode of transportation, 
to simply another agrarian society, which produces a greater number of 
wagons; rather, it involves a nonlinear successive order transformation 
process from a lower-order wagon-economy to a higher-order, train, 
automobile, airplane, and spaceship economy as the economy becomes 
more sophisticated and undergoes a qualitative change. Economic 
development is a process in which the complexity of the economy is 
amplified with the society’s qualitative transformation from an agrarian 
into an industrial economy and finally into a knowledge-based economy. 
Infinitely adding new commodities and even creating new resources 
rather than resting on the status quo of the order of economy is the 
essence of the process of dynamic economic development. The market 
depicted in current economics textbooks is inadequate for explaining 
such a process because they usually assume the economy remains as 
order-fixed. The perspective toward the market must change to explain 
the order transformation of a complex economy.
In this study, the market is regarded as an ED device, which 
induces the motivation for development by providing differential reward 
according to performance. Such discrimination by the market is the 
driving force behind the advancement of the economy to a higher order. 
For any society to integrate and maximize its wealth creation efforts, it 
should be able to maximize the incentive for growth and development 
by matching rewards to performance for every member of the society. 
In other words, people become motivated when they are fairly rewarded 
for their actions. However, this role of the market has not been well 
recognized. In this perspective, the market is the device that leads 
all members to push the economy to a higher order. Such ED by the 
market is the driving force behind economic development.
The market’s discrimination function can be better understood in 
connection with reality. In the market, we as consumers vote with 
purchasing power (money) only for companies and individuals who 
supply goods and services that most suit our taste. Banks lend larger 
sum of money at a lower interest rate only to those who economically 
perform better; stock market investors selectively buy shares of only 
good companies that are successful; and the brightest people only 
compete for the best companies, and companies seek to hire only the 
brightest of the brightest and conduct business with only the best-
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performing companies. Therefore, all players in the market help 
concentrate economic power to superior players by selecting only those 
who are producing the finest results. Just like the God in the dictum, 
“God helps those who help themselves,” the market, via ED, induces 
all economic agents to exert themselves to their fullest to be the chosen 
one. Such “differential treatment by the market” is the driving force 
behind economic development. Thus, we as market players turn out to 
be none other than the basis of economic inequality.
Consequently, our better performing next-door neighbor becomes 
more popular and richer, and economic development itself inevitably 
becomes an uneven phenomenon. The concentration of economic power 
to well-performing companies and the disparity in the level of personal 
or regional development are natural outcomes. Therefore, development 
is impossible without the concentration of resources to companies and 
individuals who perform well as a result of their hard work. Therefore, 
in reality, the market is a motivator that induces people to work hard 
and become successful themselves, with the threat of falling behind 
via economic inequality, which is created by the relatively greater 
compensation to those who economically perform better.
B. Market is always Imperfect in ED 
Nevertheless, in reality, the market cannot perfectly conduct its role of 
providing differential compensation due to imperfect information in the 
market. Which company is top-notch and which person is truly doing 
well is difficult to determine. In many cases, economic development 
is a process in which one learns the knowledge of one’s successful 
predecessors and often outperforms them. Such success know-hows 
are a valuable asset for the latecomers to learn; however, adequately 
compensating the forerunners for passing down such valuable assets is 
difficult. Given the abstract and elusive nature of the so-called success 
know-hows as a commodity, setting market prices without incurring 
high transaction costs is difficult. This phenomenon is caused by 
the market transaction always involving a price discovery procedure 
among market participants as they haggle over prices, wherein positive 
transaction costs arise. Therefore, free-riding on the forerunners’ 
success know-how by the latecomers becomes ubiquitous due to the 
high transaction costs. Information is imperfect because human beings 
are imperfect. Hence, the market is bound to fail in perfect ED.
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Then, what would happen if all of us market players perform 
poorly on adequate compensation, in other words, if we all free-ride 
on forerunners’ valuable success know-how? Society, which provides 
less compensation compared to one’s level of performance inevitably 
falls into complacency. Would people attempt to work hard when they 
are treated unfairly? This situation can be referred to as sabotage, 
from which socialist regimes have collapsed. The number of hard-
working people decreases, and growing businesses and talented 
workers gradually disappear; hence, the economy becomes stagnant or 
degenerates into an underdeveloped state. Such market discrimination 
failure or development failure is the reality of underdeveloped countries 
or non-developing developed countries with a stagnant economic 
growth.
C.  Market needs to be rescued by Corporate Firm, which however is not 
enough
In the early stage of industrial revolution, the capitalist economy 
invented the joint-stock company, which has been supplementing the 
market’s developmental failure and leading economic development all 
along. Corporate firms can avoid the transaction costs due to their 
structure of vertical command system, unlike the market mechanism 
based on mutual agreement on the terms of trade, such as price and 
quantity. Corporate firms can therefore help solve market failure in 
ED by internalizing know-how sharing (exchanging) activities and 
eventually help expand the extent of the market network and domain.4 
This is how corporate firms arise as the economic discriminator that 
reinforces the market function and the key locomotive for economic 
development of the capitalist economy ever since its inception. The 
joint-stock company is the key feature of the capitalist economy, which 
was nonexistent in agrarian economy; meanwhile, market exchange 
4 This argument is consistent with that of Simon (1991), who considered 
the market as the network of organizations that play the substantive role in 
the economic system while the market is simply a network among them. He 
argued that the organizational economy better describes the nature of capitalist 
economy than the market economy. Corporate organization is the main private 
organization. This author used to contend that a capitalist economy is a 
corporate economy rather than the market economy, which is usually overlooked 
in economics. See Jwa (2017a) for an extended argument.
203Understanding Korea’s saemaUl Undong 
is common in both economies. Capitalistic joint-stock company is the 
emergent organization with potentially unlimited capital base evolving 
from the agrarian blacksmith shop. 
However, corporations alone cannot completely overcome the 
problem of free-riding because successful forerunner companies are 
also subject to the latecomers’ free-riding on their success know-how; 
thus, successful forerunners are not sufficiently compensated by the 
market. Consequently, successful corporations appear only sporadically 
and never last forever; likewise, superior civilizations and superior 
economies can never last forever, which can be compared to a bus 
company that goes bankrupt due to free riders.
D.  Economic Development Function of the Government: Helping those 
who help themselves by ED 
The more underdeveloped the economy is, the greater the imperfection 
of information in the market is. Expecting the market discrimination 
to be active in a stagnant agrarian society is unlikely. The most 
imperative mission of underdeveloped countries—or more specifically, 
the political leaders of underdeveloped countries—is to determine how 
to motivate and incentivize dormant individuals, small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), rural villages, and the entire society to grow 
and develop. History tells that countries who accomplished this mission 
succeeded in development and vice versa for those who failed.
The role of the government becomes important at this point. How 
should the government address this problem? Traditional mainstream 
economics, which regards the market as a perfect place of resource 
allocation, still does not properly appreciate such a problem and 
cannot provide any good answers. The role of the government becomes 
evident according to our view of the market. In other words, we reach 
the proposition that the government should complement and strengthen 
the vulnerable ED function of the market and give preference to market 
players who help themselves to succeed. The government should create 
the incentive and motivation for growth and development, which tend 
to be weak by market alone, by giving adequate compensation for 
excellent results produced by individuals and corporate firms who help 
themselves to succeed. This approach indeed will foster the “can-do 
self-help spirit,” which is the ideology behind economic development 
and can help trigger the competition for success within the economy. 
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After all, taking the lead in expanding the domain of the market 
and strengthening rather than weakening the market function are 
the fundamental developmental roles of the government. Economic 
development can be initiated through building “an incentive system 
that guarantees corresponding reward to results” by closely observing 
the economic performance of market players.
E.  ED and Holy Trinity of Economic Development, Market, Corporation 
and Government
The new general theory of economic development can be summarized 
as shown by Figure 1, where sustainable economic development can 
only occur when the “holy trinity” of development, market, corporation 
and the government jointly exercise the principle of ED. The area noted 
as ED, which represents the joint efforts of the holy trinity, can result 
in sustainable economic development.
What would happen if the government or politics—just as many 
countries after the World War II pursued revised capitalism or social 
democracy or sought to become a welfare state, not to mention the 
now collapsed socialist economies—seeks to continue implementing 
“social or redistribution policies that provide more compensation to 
low performance rather than high performance in order to achieve 
an economically more equal society,” claiming that the market 





                         Source: Jwa (2017a)
Figure 1
ED anD Holy TriniTy of Economic DEvElopmEnT 
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Market discrimination would stop working, economic development 
would discontinue, and the economy would degenerate due to the 
misalignment of incentives. It would be difficult for the economy to 
recover if the double standards of politicians, intellectuals, and the 
general public remain, as they continue to support the political voice 
for compensating low performance in the expense of high performers 
while they all eagerly reward high performance in the private market. 
We should remember that humans are all epitome of economic 
discrimination endorsing the natural economic inequalities in the 
market. From this perspective, Jwa (2017a) states a grand principle of 
economic development that ED is the necessary condition for economic 
development while economic egalitarianism, by mitigating ED, becomes 
a sufficient condition for economic stagnation.
F.  Economic Policy Paradigm of the Park Chung Hee Era: “ED Policy 
through the Economization of Politics”
This section discusses President Park Chung Hee’s economic policy 
paradigm. President Park applied strict ED principle not only on 
economic policies but also on social policies throughout his era. By 
definition, ED means rewarding those who perform well and penalizing 
those with poor results. In fact, this is exactly what we all do in the 
market every day.President Park strengthened the market function of 
providing differential incentives and boosted rivalry by allowing the 
market domain to expand through the strict application of ED principle. 
He consistently emphasized to the people as well as businessmen, 
both privately and publicly, that “high performance rather than low 
performance should be compensated.” Although he knew that adhering 
to and asserting this principle would be politically unpopular, he kept 
his adherence sometimes, even if he had to submit himself to political 
risk. The SMU, which is the main subject of this study, is one of such 
cases as will be explained later.
However, since the democratic political system with the “one-man, 
one-vote” principle unfortunately tends to introduce economic policies 
in a way to maximize votes, a risk of creating institutions and policies 
exist, which go against the market function of ED. This phenomenon 
is the backdrop to the birth of welfare states, social democracies, and 
revised capitalism, as well as populist politics, as has been widely 
witnessed in South Korea now and many other countries in the post-
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war era. Although President Park’s non-democratic, authoritarian 
political rule has been criticized; denying that such type of rule had 
partially contributed to preventing the political distortion of the ED 
policy is difficult. In other words, his authoritarian rule had protected 
the ED principle from distortion by egalitarian populist politics, 
which demand “anti-discrimination” or “more compensation to low 
performance according to egalitarianism.” Hence, this study argues that 
Park’s paradigm of economic policy is a paradigm of ED through the 
economization of politics. 
Some of the Park-Era discrimination policies that are noticeable 
in the above perspective are as follows5: 1) export promotion policy 
that provided support only to those companies with high export 
sales; 2) heavy and chemical industry promotion policy that allowed 
only superior exporters to participate; 3) SMEs promotion policy that 
consistently supported high-exporting companies; as will be elaborated 
below, 4) SMU that provided support only to high-performing villages 
and 5) Saemaul factory promotion policy that only supported those 
high-performing factories. Although the aforementioned policies are 
particularly noteworthy, Park did not fundamentally deviate from the 
discrimination principle when appointing people to government posts 
or implementing other public policies. Hence, the government-led ED 
policy allowed the Korean economy to take a great leap forward.
III. History of SMU 
A. Background
As is well-known, the key driving force for the SMU was the strong 
will of former President Park that the rural mindset, which lacks in 
motivation for growth and development and accepts poverty as their 
fate due to the lack of self-help spirit, should change to a development-
friendly, self-help one.6 After having seen in person on August 4, 1969 
and been so impressed with the flood-damage reconstruction site, which 
5 The detailed accounts for the economic discrimination nature of the policies 
can be found in Jwa (2017b).
6 Bishop (1897) observed that such attitude was prevalent during the late 
Chosun Dynasty (old Korean kingdom) and was formed under the exploitive 
rules of the game, which had been long set by the Monarchy. 
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was managed successfully in a self-help manner by the villagers in 
Sindo-ri, Chungdo-eup, Kyungsang-bukdo, President Park was known 
to decide to seek such a new village development campaign. Later, on 
April 22, 1970, he announced his determination for the SMU at the 
national meeting of provincial governors for anti-drought measures.7 
President Park himself declared “diligence, self-help, and cooperation” 
as the Saemaul spirit.
Although the SMU was launched under the backdrop of President 
Park’s strong leadership, it appears to have several pressing purposes, 
such as (i) improving the poor performance of social reform movements, 
such as the 4-H Movement or the National Reconstruction Campaign, 
which had been conducted in rural communities since the previous 
administration; (ii) narrowing the income gap between urban and 
rural areas, which had been widening as a result of a seven-year-long 
industrialization policy; and (iii) resolving the overproduction problem 
of the domestic cement industry caused by the stagnation of the 
Southeast Asian cement export market in the early 1970s. 
B. Implementation Process and Outcomes of the SMU
a) The first round (November 1970–May 1971)
The SMU was implemented during the off-farming season and was 
centered on infrastructure improvement. An average of 200–300 sacks 
of cement were distributed to approximately 34,000 villages8 with 
some variations according to their respective sizes, and about 10 new 
village projects were proposed for rural infrastructure improvement 
(i.e., repairing village access roads; modernizing house roofs and fences; 
installing public wells and wash places; renewing streams; building 
bridges, compost facilities, temporary water supply facilities, and farm 
roads; and renovating houses and conducting productivity increase 
campaigns). The selection of projects and their implementation were left 
to the discretion of the village general assemblies.
7 April 22 is now designated as the SMU Day and celebrated every year.
8 The total number of villages turns out to be different depending on the 
researchers and even among the President Park and his aides. This number 
(34,000) is an approximation of about 34,660 villages from Kim (1990), which 
may be more precise. Nevertheless, 34,000 is used in this study because it seems 
more consistent with President Park’s approximation in his remark, as quoted in 
Section III. 
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b) The second round (1972)
After monitoring and evaluating the villages’ performance, an average 
of 500 sacks of cement and 1 ton of reinforcing steel bars were provided 
exclusively to high-performing villages (about 16,000), and the rest 
(about 18,000 villages) who were lagging behind were excluded from 
government support and were told to be left out from the SMU unless 
they make progress in the next round with their own efforts. Cash 
subsidies of around 1 million KRW9 were also provided to some of the 
villages with exceptionally good results.
c) Since then, every village was categorized into either a self-reliant 
(jahrip), self-help (jahjo), or basic (gheecho) village according to the 
level of its performance, and government support was only centered 
on the high-performing, self-reliant, and self-help villages, whereas the 
underperforming basic villages were excluded.
d) Implementation of the Saemaul factory promotion policy since 1973
As part of the SMU, the government implemented the Saemaul 
factory promotion policy, which was a strategy to industrialize rural 
areas by building agricultural food processing plants in the eup and 
myon areas (small local administrative units). Support was provided in 
the form of tax credits, export subsidies, and operating cost subsidies. 
This policy was implemented under the principle that support 
should be determined on the basis of performance. According to the 
performance analysis of the then Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
in the first evaluation year (1973–1974), out of 270 Saemaul factories, 
approximately 30% performed well, whereas the other 70% performed 
poorly. Accordingly, the government increased support to only those 
high-performing 30%, whereas it cut back on support to the others.10
9 This approximates the current value of USD 100,000. 
10 According to the then manager (division chief) of the Saemaul Factory 
Support Project under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Cho Nam Hong), 
the Blue House (Presidential Office) took the lead in conducting the policy of 
differential support on the basis of performance. Against such policy, Mr. Cho 
appealed by arguing that the low-performing 70% would be able to perform well 
if they were given slightly more support; however, he was demoted to another 
post, and the policy was implemented as originally designed.
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e) Results
The Newsweek reported some impressive outcomes of the SMU on 
November 17, 1975 (pp. 19-20) as follows, “As the President and his 
Saemaul leaders explain it, the aim of the program is to revitalize the 
South Korean spirit, to promote national unity and to instill an ethos 
of self-help for development. And statistically, at least, the results are 
impressive. The Movement claims to have improved the water supply 
systems in nearly 16,000 villages, built thousands of village meeting 
halls and, sometimes against the villagers’ wishes, replaced more than 
million thatched farmhouse roofs with modern tile. Saemaul-seeded 
cottage industries have helped boost rural income per household from 
747 USD in 1970 to 1,760 USD last year.” 
According to the report by Ministry of Home Affairs (1980), by 1977, 
98% of the villages became “self-reliant,” and no basic villages were left. 
Every village became either a self-help or self-reliant village, and the 
income gap between urban and rural areas narrowed, thereby boosting 
income per household in rural areas which surpassed that in urban 




Source: The Bank of Korea 
Figure 2 
Comparison of average income per household between rural and urban areas 
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IV. Theory of the SMU Success 
The existing studies on the SMU have so far been listing and 
emphasizing many elements of the Korea’s SMU as the success 
factors; such elements include effective political leadership, efficient 
administrative arrangements, high quality of the SMU leadership 
(including female leaders), traditional convention of cooperation in 
rural villages, ideological reform, Saemaul education, community 
participation, and community-driven development. However, although 
these studies provide useful information as a description on the SMU, 
they remain tautological only by listing the outcomes without explaining 
why and how these good outcomes could only be achieved with the 
SMU.11 Particularly, previous studies have failed to determine the key 
nature of good political leadership behind the success of the SMU. 
Moreover, the studies did not discuss why and how those ideologically 
dependent, blaming-others, non-cooperative, and unproductive villagers, 
including future Saemaul leaders who had been regarded for long as 
hopeless of development, suddenly turned into active, competitive, 
cooperative, self-help, and pro-developmental people and led the 
community development to a success. Was it all because of the Saemaul 
education? History tells that education alone is insufficient. The new 
institutional economics perspective (North 1990; Jwa 2017a, 2017b) 
strongly suggests that for the success of the SMU, a development 
friendly institutional reform in the rules of the SMU game must come 
into existence to change the peoples’ mindset and behavior, which are 
prone to strong path-dependence, into being self-help and development-
friendly. In this regard, a theory of the SMU is needed to answer such 
“why and how” questions and provide the nature of development-
friendly institutions, thereby setting the direction of institutional reform. 
However, thus far, many descriptive studies but no theory has been the 
11 See, for example, Kim (2015) for the detailed description of the so-called 
success elements of the SMU; however, this study is only descriptive and 
tautological, without explanation on why and how the elements were achievable 
only with Korea’s SMU for Park Chung Hee era but not with any other times 
and any other similar efforts in domestic and international contexts. That is, the 
reasons why and how all the villages and people known for long as dependent 
have suddenly turned into self-help individuals and led the SMU actively have 
yet to be discovered.  
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case with most of the existing SMU studies. Thus, the present study 
intends to fill this gap by developing a theory of the SMU success.
Using only few factors may be difficult to account for the success 
of the SMU; however, “the government-led discrimination policy of 
providing exclusive support to self-helping villages” may be the single 
most important factor for success among the various other factors, 
considering the previously discussed basic principles of economic 
development. The Korean process of implementing a government-led ED 
principle was indeed dramatic in the following sense.12
The basic philosophy of former President Park Chung Hee who led 
the SMU is as follows, “Those peasants who complain as if their poverty 
is due to the fault of others, believing that they are in poverty since the 
government does not support them and lamenting that poverty is their 
fate, cannot stand up on themselves even if several hundred years pass 
by. It is a waste of money to support those without motivation. For lazy 
people, even the government cannot help them.”13 This message of the 
former President was addressed to the peasants during the SMU. 
In November 1970 when the SMU started, the government provided 
200–300 sacks of cement, some steel bars, and few cash grants to 
approximately 34,000 villages according to their respective sizes. In 
the following year, about 16,000 villages attained most of the goals, 
whereas the other 18,000 villages, which accounted for more than half 
of all villages, failed to do so. Government inspection reports indicated 
that many of the villages left cement sacks heaped on the field and did 
not even cover them from the rain. A heated controversy existed over 
the method of supporting the second-round SMU project after such 
disappointing results. Despite counterarguments by ministers and 
politicians who advocated egalitarian support as they did in the first 
round, President Park insisted on ceasing any type of support to the 
low-performing 18,000 villages and increased the amount of cement by 
100–200 sacks only to those high-performing 16,000 villages with some 
cash grants to the best performers, even by practically risking the fate 
of his authoritarian power that was not very popular at that time. He 
12 Most of the discussion henceforth is quoted and/or translated from the 
author’s previous work in Korean (2006, pp. 272–275). 
13 Re-quoted from Kim (1997, p. 257)
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kept the principle of helping those who help themselves, that is, ED.14 
Starting from the second round, the government had notified 
instructions that it would not subsidize villages who do not perform 
well in the SMU. Interestingly, the result of second round showed that 
6,000 villages among the unsupported 18,000 voluntarily participated 
and exceeded the target. The third-round support was then extended 
to those 6,000 villages as well.15 Similar discriminatory selection and 
support principle had been applied to the successive rounds.
Present-day politicians of Korea will surely argue that the government 
should support and promote the low-performing “basic villages” first “for 
the success of the SMU.” Moreover, regardless of the possibility of the 
success of the SMU, they will be more prone to make such arguments 
to win votes, even if the theory tells the egalitarian support will lead to 
failure rather than success.
President Park’s remarks on the necessity for the SMU to be based on 
discriminatory principles are as follows: 
“As a result of supporting 32,000 villages in the whole country, 
albeit not enough to awaken farmers’ and fishermen’s self-help spirit, 
there were some villages which performed well and others which didn’t. 
Making use of such experience, we decided to reject the idea of uniform 
support and to support only 16,000 successful villages, which accounts 
for roughly half of the villages supported last year. It means that villages 
which did a poor job last year should be left behind and those which did 
well will be continuously supported in the second round. The selected 
16,000 villages will be screened again in autumn and those with high 
performance will be promoted to 3rd grade next year. 
14 The then Chief Secretary of President Park (Kim Chung-yum) told an 
interesting story about the process of deciding such discriminatory support. The 
initial cabinet decision was to provide egalitarian support as before in the second 
round—possibly having considered the political burden of not doing so; however, 
the government’s final decision adopted discriminatory support since President 
Park insisted on doing so even if it might mean losing his political power. The 
then Secretary General of the ruling Republican Party (Gil Jeon-Sig) and Minister 
of Home Affairs (Kim Hyun-Ok) attempted to persuade the President in vain 
and five political heavyweights of the ruling Republican Party had attempted 
again but also in vain. This episode was confirmed by the authors’ personal 
conversation with the then Chief Secretary of the President, Kim Chung-yum.
15 The aforementioned SMU performance data was quoted from Kim (1990, pp. 
189-190).
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And those villages which failed the test last year but endeavored to 
unite and make progress this year will be re-selected to be promoted 
to 2nd grade and be provided with the same amount of support as this 
year. If their performance gets worse next year, they will be downgraded 
but otherwise, they will be promoted to 3rd grade. Re-evaluating these 
3rd graders, promoting those who do well to 4th grade and providing full-
fledged support to them is the basic government policy for the SMU. 
Why do we have to do so? The answer is simple. We have witnessed 
that providing uniform support to rural villages did not bring results 
as good as expected. I think we should first help those diligent 
villages which perform well. Even if two villages are neighbored, it is 
always possible for one to substantially improve in income and living 
environment while the other could be left far behind. 
It is rather unfair if we provide the same amount of assistance to 
those decadent villages indulging in gambling and drinking and the other 
hard-working villages struggling to live a better life. Those villages which 
made steady progress will be able to stand on their own with a little 
more government support. Of course, those left behind would complain. 
The voice of lazy villages which are lagging behind may sound loud while 
those who perform well remain silent, but there is no need to listen to 
their complaints.”16
Interestingly, this statement is perfectly in accordant with “The 
Parable of the Three Servants” in the Gospel of Mathew (Chapter 25 in 
the Bible), in which the servant who doubled the value of bags of gold 
during the absence of his master was given high appraisal, even with 
an additional bag of gold, whereas the one who failed was deprived 
of even the bag of gold previously given to him. Here, we believe that 
the discriminatory support policy of the government contributed to 
raising the pro-developmental “self-help and can-do” spirit in rural 
communities and helping spread the SMU throughout the entire nation. 
According to our principles of development, the SMU might have not 
succeeded if the second-round program was based on egalitarian 
16 This is the author’s translation of a part of President Park’s speech delivered 
to Kyungsang-bukdo provincial government officials on Feb. 7, 1972. Another 
English version of the same speech can be found in Park (1979, pp. 117-118). 
In this quotation, the total number of villages (32,000) should be read as about 
34,000, as reported by Kim (1990), which provides the precise number (34,660). 
Seemingly, the President possibly attempted to approximate this number.
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distribution of subsidies.17 
Moreover, the field of behavioral economics has already discovered 
that two systems of differential incentive structure can be powerful in 
driving the peoples’ economic behavior; one is the gain framing, which 
means rewarding those who performed well, and the other is the loss 
framing, which indicates punishing those who performed poorly by 
taking back the promised reward; Between the two, loss framing is 
more powerful.18 Interestingly, the discriminatory incentive structure 
of the SMU also involved not only the gain framing of giving positive 
reward to better-performing villages but also the loss framing of leaving 
out the non- or less-performing ones from the SMU support. The SMU, 
intended or not, combined both framings cleverly. 
Another important feature of the SMU from the perspective of the 
holy trinity of economic development is the official designation of the 
entire village as an economic entity, as well as a basic administration 
unit to represent all member villagers. This feature enabled villages 
to act like a corporate firm to internalize the aforementioned market 
failure. The village, as a market with villagers left considerably to their 
own self-discretion, may be subject to high transaction costs, stemming 
from consensus-building and concerted actions and eventually lead to 
free-riding and market failure. The consolidation of the entire village 
into an economic team or organization working toward common goals 
helped minimize such inefficiency and maximize the consolidated 
effort of individual villages to meet the stiff performance competition 
among themselves under the rule of ED set by the government. In 
this context, the SMU leaders who embodied self-help spirit could 
emerge and play an important leadership role as an entrepreneur of 
village organization.19 From this perspective, Korea’s SMU is perfectly 
consistent with the implications of the general theory of economic 
17 One can find President Park’s speeches and remarks on Saemaul Undong 
are full of such philosophy of discriminatory incentive. See Park (1979) for the 
details on this. In addition, Kahn (1979, pp. 358-360) is a very early and rare 
precursor who observed such discriminatory support policy as the important 
aspect of successful SMU. 
18 See for example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981), and Gneezy and List (2013) for this perspective. 
19 The government also worked hard to educate the SMU leaders, as well as 
social leaders in general, to be fully informed about the purpose and spirit of the 
SMU and learn about the leadership role.
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development (Jwa 2017a) summarized in Section II. The holy trinity—
interpreted here as consisting of the village as a market, with the 
villagers being individual market agents; the village as an organization 
playing the unit of competition led by the SMU leaders; and the 
government setting and enforcing the SMU rules of the game—all 
worked together and guided by the ED principle, which eventually led 
to the remarkable success. In this process, as the SMU expanded into 
the Urban and Factory Saemaul Undong, which eventually turned into 
a nationwide movement, the Saemaul spirit of “diligence, self-help, and 
cooperation” had naturally been instilled not only in the mindset of the 
villagers but also in all Koreans. 
Thus, the present study proposes that the economically discriminatory 
incentive structure (as the new rules of the SMU game) imposed on the 
villagers, as well as the villages, and enforced by the government was 
the most critical success factor for the SMU. This study also claims that 
the ED is the key feature of the SMU behind all the good outcomes. 
This principle should then be the key element of a development-friendly 
institutional reform. In sum, the ED principle is the grand theory of the 
success of the SMU. 
V. Loss of the SMU Spirit due to Egalitarianism
The spirit of the SMU began to be rapidly lost due to the spread of 
egalitarianism in the Post-Park Chung Hee Era. President Park Chung 
Hee emphasized from the beginning of the SMU that the campaign of 
“Let us prosper,” which had been the catchphrase for the SMU, should 
be a voluntary self-help and self-reliant movement on the basis of 
grass-roots level and strictly prohibited any attempt to use the SMU for 
political purposes. The then opposition party denigrated the SMU as a 
political campaign; however, there using the SMU for elections became 
unnecessary since the Yushin regime started in 1972,20 and finding 
evidence that the SMU was used for political purposes is difficult. The 
20 In October 1972, President Park Chung Hee introduced the so-called 
Yushin political regime under the emergency Martial Law by adopting the new 
constitution that mandated the indirect election of the president, thereby almost 
guaranteeing permanent presidency for him. This episode became the most 
critical “Achilles tendon” for his political career even if economic efficiency of 
political system had improved as he argued in support for the Yushin regime.
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efforts to keep the discriminatory support system intact from political 
manipulation in the second round of the SMU and thereafter, as well 
as in the Saemaul factory promotion policy, are vivid evidence of how 
President Park was wary of political distortion against the SMU.
However, since the Fifth Republic (1981–1987), after the death of 
President Park in October 1979, the SMU started to become politicized, 
deviating from its original non-political, social reform purpose. As Korea 
became rapidly democratized with the Sixth Republic (1988–1992), the 
policy for the SMU has also turned into anti-discriminatory, egalitarian 
supportive policy, in addition to becoming politically distorted. 
Especially, as the issue of liberalization and opening of the agricultural 
market became more pressing with Korea’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization, the restructuring of the agricultural sector became 
a matter of national concern and a controversial political issue. During 
Kim Young Sam’s administration (1993–1997), restructuring funds 
worth more than 100 trillion KRW were distributed to the agricultural 
sector in a non-discriminatory manner regardless of restructuring 
performance. The same situation occurred during Kim Dae Jung’s 
administration (1998–2002), which declared debt relief for rural 
communities, thereby uniformly cutting interest rates on rural debts 
regardless of their effort and performance.
After all, why is agricultural restructuring still overdue despite all the 
money invested in it, and why does opening up the rice market remain 
such a difficult problem? Did all the claims for restructuring not end 
in vain? Comparing the successful SMU by President Park Chung Hee 
with the agricultural restructuring policy that has been ongoing for the 
last 20 years is an interesting subject. A thought-provoking question 
would be what caused the enormous difference in the amount of fund 
invested along with the results brought out by them. The answer seems 
simple. President Park’s SMU adopted an ED strategy, which induced 
the motive for change; whereas the restructuring policy implemented 
an anti-discriminatory, egalitarian support policy, which became an 
impediment to the motivation for change. Public policies, which provide 
uniform and indiscriminate support and reduced interest rates for 
farmers regardless of their performance, are a reverse discrimination 
against those farmers who have performed well because these policies 
give preferential treatment for relatively low-performing and high-
indebted farmers. For more than 20 years, the restructuring policy in 
the agricultural sector has demotivated farmers and discontinued their 
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incentives to grow and develop and has gone against restructuring 
by preferring those stagnated farmers over farmers who are eager to 
change and improve their businesses. Therefore, the unsatisfactory 
result of the agricultural restructuring policy was due to the departure 
from the “policy of ED according to strict meritocracy, ‘never failing 
to reward a merit or letting a fault go unpunished.’” Indeed, the poor 
result was also partially caused by political populism, which politicized 
and distorted the economic policies due to the political concern over 
votes after democratization. In the end, everything can be traced back 
to the lack of political leadership that values the nature of ED policy.
VI.  Empirical Analysis of the Effect of SMU on Economic 
Growth
Thus far, none of the studies on Korea’s SMU has undertaken 
systematic empirical works on its effect, although researchers have 
speculated and argued from anecdotal evidence (Figure 2) that the 
positive impact of the SMU must be the case. The main stumbling block 
to the systematic empirical works has been the existing production 
function approach, which cannot distinctively identify the effect of the 
SMU from the overall efficiency gains stemming from the total factor 
productivity (TFP) increase, institutional improvement, or any other 
factors in addition to those of capital and labor. Therefore, to address 
this problem, a new framework must be developed, as shown as follows.
Suppose we adopt the traditional production function approach as 
 y = A · f (K, L),  (1)
where y is the aggregate output, A is the efficiency factor, K is the 
total capital stock, and L is the labor stock. In Equation (1), any other 
factors not captured by K and L, including the effects of technological 
changes (usually known as the source of TFP) and institutional reform, 
are assumed to be represented by A. Similarly, the SMU can only be 
assumed to be represented by the efficiency factor A because it works 
through changing the peoples’ mindset and economic behavior, which 
is similar to institutional change. Therefore, in this case, the effect 
of SMU cannot be easily separated from the usual effect of TFP, not 
to mention the effect of various institutional changes, given that the 
variable measuring SMU is not easily obtainable. Furthermore, the fact 
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that the TFP is usually estimated as the residuals of Equation (1) makes 
it almost impossible to attribute the residual estimates into the effects 
of TFP, SMU, other institutional reforms, and the remaining residuals.21 
To address this problem, a new model of macroeconomic productivity 
analysis is adopted in this study based on the concept of a corporate 
production function developed by Jwa (2017a and 2018) to be consistent 
with the general theory of economic development summarized in 
Section II. Although the traditional production function (Equation (1)) 
implicitly assumes that the market is a grand aggregator of factors of 
K, L, and others, an aggregate corporate production function assumes 
that a corporate firm is the grand aggregator and can be expressed as 
follows:
 y = A · g(CA, L),  (2)
where y is the aggregate output; and A is the efficiency factor as 
in Equation (1) but now representing economic institutional effects 
surrounding the corporate sector as a whole. CA is the economy’s total 
corporate assets that aggregate the economy’s total productive assets 
which are actively utilized by the corporate sector, such as capital 
and any other type of non-human productive resources, including 
technology. L is the total number of employed labor. In Equation (2), 
the aggregate output is a function of aggregate corporate assets and 
labor, and the TFP, as well as the effect of capital K, can be captured 
by CA because the technology, as well as the capital, is internalized by 
CA. Assume that function g is linearly homogeneous of degree one with 
respect to CA and L. Then, Equation (2) can be rewritten as follows:
 y/L = A · g(CA/L),  (3)
where per capita income (y/L) is a function of per capita corporate 
assets (CA/L).22 Furthermore, factor A can now be interpreted as the 
21 In addition to this problem of identifying the true effect of TFP, Equation 
(1) has the measurement problem of capital, labor, and technology, as well as 
the theoretical definitional problem of capital, as shown by the well-known 
Cambridge capital controversies on the concept of capital.
22 Here, if Equation (3) is assumed as a linear form as (y/L) = α + β(CA/L) + 
ɛ, then (y/L) can be interpreted as permanent annuity flow, β as discount rate 
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effect of institutional change, such that the effect of the SMU can be 
estimated without being compounded by the effect of TFP. Accordingly, 
the identification problem is greatly alleviated while the issue of how 
to separate the effects of institutional changes via SMU and other 
channels remain. One can only hope that the remaining identification 
problem can be minimized by utilizing an instrumental variable 
specifically related to the SMU, although imperfectly. 
Equation (3) is used to test the hypothesis that the SMU had been 
effective in increasing per capita income for the period of 1972–1979. 
This period is when the SMU, as an institution, had been actively 
enforced in motivating self-help spirit or mindset to change the people’s 
economic behavior. This hypothesis will also help verify whether the 
SMU has been effective in the post-Park Chung Hee Era under the anti-
ED egalitarianism.  
Two proxy variables are utilized for the SMU: One is the dummy 
variable, which is 1 for 1972–1979 of the active SMU period but zero 
otherwise; and the other is the weight of self-help villages that needs 
some explanation, and its data are given in Table 1. The SMU identified 
three classes of villages depending on their respective performances. The 
qualifications for the self-help village set by the government are 1) house 
and (CA/L) as the sum of the present values of discounted annuity flows (y/L) 
discounted by β. In other words, the stock of national productive assets, (CA/L) 
creates the income flows (y/L) at the rate of β, the nation’s marginal productivity. 
The constant term, α can be interpreted as per capita income of the purely 
agrarian economy void of any corporate production. The similar interpretation 
is also applicable to a log linear form. See Jwa (2017a) for more details on this 
model. In addition, here, L is interpreted as the total population instead of total 
employees, such that (y/L) and (CA/L) are interpreted as per capita, not per 
employee mainly due to the convention of using per capita measure and the 
data availability in actual regression.
Table 1
DaTa on THE wEigHT of sElf-HElp villagEs
Year 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Weight of self-help 
villages
0.469 0.693 0.822 0.885 0.991 1.0 1.0 1.0
Note:  Data are calculated based on the numbers of self-help and self-reliant 
villages compiled by Ministry of Home Affairs (1980). 
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roof improvement ≥ 70%; 2) farmland irrigation facility improvement 
≥ 70%; 3) village fund ≥ 0.5 million won; and 4) average household 
income ≥ 0.8 million won. The qualifications for the self-reliant village 
are 1) house roof improvement ≥ 80%; 2) farmland irrigation facility 
improvement ≥ 85%; 3) village fund ≥ 1 million won; and 4) average 
household income ≥ 1.4 million won. The remaining lowest performers 
are classified as the basic village. The data on the weight of self-help 
villages combine two groups of self-help and self-reliant villages and 
take on the weight of these villages out of total number of villages. 
Table 2 reports the estimation results of Equation (3) in a log linear 
form, together with information about the variables given in the note. 
The results show that the SMU hypothesis is statistically supported. 
For now, in view of Korea’s overall economic performance over the 
last 60 years, a 1% increase in total per capita real corporate assets 
is associated with approximately 0.57% increase in per capita real 
income, which can be considered macro marginal productivity of the 
corporate sector. Korea has undergone two important institutional 
changes during the last 60 years: one is the political democratization 
in 1987, and the other is the corporate restructuring reform with Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 that brought Korea to the brink of sovereign 
debt default; in view of the effects of these institutional changes, Ln per 
CA (88~) and Ln per CA (97~) are used for the former and the latter, 
respectively, the explanation of which is given in the note of Table 2. 
The empirical results show that both events seem to have contributed 
to minor improvement in the macro marginal productivity. Korea’s 
economic policy paradigm began to depart from the ED policy regime 
from the early 1980s with the Fifth Republic and rapidly turned into 
an anti-ED egalitarian policy regime with political democratization in 
the late 1980s. The newly adopted anti-ED policy regime since the Fifth 
Republic introduced anti-corporate growth policies to reduce economic 
power concentration, thereby seriously weakening the incentive for 
growth in the corporate sector. Consequently, the growth rate of per 
capita real corporate assets began to decline since the early 1980s and 
had drastically declined after the 1997 financial crisis. (See Figure 3). 
Accordingly, Korea’s growth rate of per capita real GDP had also begun 
to decline after the political democratization, from approximately 8% 
in the late 1980s to about 2.5% in recent years in terms of the trend 
growth rate. The drastic cut in the growth rate of the corporate sector, 
even with the marginal increase of the corporate sector productivity 
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Table 2
rEgrEssion rEsulTs of EquaTion (3) wiTH smu proxy variablEs
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Ln per GDP Ln per GDP Ln per GDP
























SMU dum (72–79) 0.097***
(0.0265)










R2 0.993 0.994 0.994
observations 48 48 48
Notes: 1)  Standard errors in parentheses are calculated by using EViews to be 
robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, 
and *p < 0.1.
          2)  Note on the variables: Per GDP is Korea’s per capita real GDP from 
the Bank of Korea shown in Figure 4. Per CA is Korea’s per capita real 
corporate assets shown in Figure 3, which is obtained by deflating 
the per capita nominal corporate assets from Jwa (2017b) by the GDP 
deflator. Per CA (88~) is the same as per CA for 1988–2015 (post-
democratization era) and zero otherwise. Per CA (97~) is the same as per 
CA for 1997–2015 (post-financial crisis era) and zero otherwise. Three-low 
boom (86–88) is the dummy variable, which is 1 for 1986–1988 and zero 
otherwise, reflecting the three-low boom. SMU dum (72–79) is the SMU 
dummy, which is 1 for 1972–79 and zero otherwise. The weight of self-
help villages (72–79) is the weight of self-help and self-reliant villages for 
1972–1979 and zero otherwise. All variables are in natural logarithm (with 
Ln affixed), except for three-low boom, SMU dum, and weight of self-help 
villages. The sample period is from 1968–2015.
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Note:  Data are only up to 1969 to be consistent with the data on corporate assets 
in Figure 3. The dotted line denotes the actual growth rate, and the solid line 
represents the growth trend by Hodrick–Prescott filter.
Source: The Bank of Korea
Figure 4
KorEa’s growTH raTE of pEr capiTa rEal gDp
Note:  Data are available up to 1969 only. The dotted line denotes the actual growth 
rate, and the solid line represents the growth trend by Hodrick–Prescott 
filter. Nominal per capita corporate assets in Jwa (2017b) are deflated by the 
GDP deflator.
Source: Appendix in Jwa (2017b)
Figure 3
growTH raTE of pEr capiTa rEal corporaTE assETs
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through the painful restructuring efforts during the corporate 
regulation era, has adversely affected Korea’s per capita real income 
growth (See Figure 4).23 In addition, Korea experienced a remarkable 
boom during 1986–1988 due to favorable global economic conditions 
dubbed as “three lows”, that is, low interest rates, low oil prices, and 
low dollar (with weak won and strong yen). The dummy variable (three-
low boom, which is 1 for 1986–1988 and zero otherwise) is utilized and 
shows a significant positive effect.
Turning to the effects of the SMU, the result with the SMU dummy 
implies that it contributed to an increase in growth rate of per capita 
income by 9.7% for the period of 1972–1979, which amounts to an 
annual average growth of 1.16% over 8 years at a compounded rate. 
The result with the weight of self-help villages as a proxy for the SMU 
implies that per capita income increased by 10.5% for the period of 
1972–79, which amounts to an annual average of 1.26% growth over 
8 years at a compounded rate. In sum, both cases imply a slightly 
higher than 1% annual growth rate of per capita income for the period 
of the SMU (1972–1979). These results also statistically support the 
hypothesis that the SMU had been ineffective in the Post-Park Chung 
Hee Era from 1980 onwards, because the proxy variables for the SMU, 
namely, SMU dum (72–79) and weight of self-help villages, are assumed 
to be zero before and after 1972–1979. Thus, the hypothesis that the 
SMU had been effective in promoting economic growth in Park’s Era 
but its spirit as well as effectiveness has been lost in the post-Park Era 
since 1980s cannot be rejected. 
VII. Implications of SMU on Economic Development Policy 
The success of the SMU has several significant implications with 
respect to economic development theory and policy.
A.  Success Principle of the Government’s Industrial Policy: Discriminatory 
Support According to Performance
The so-called industrial policy is still one of the most controversial 
public policies for economic development. At the heart of the dispute 
regarding industrial policy is the manner in which the government 
23 See Jwa (2017b) for further details. 
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selects the winners beforehand and supports them, known as the issue 
of “picking the winner.” Those who support a market-centric approach 
believe that since the government cannot know who the winners will 
be in advance, subsidizing certain industries or companies by the 
government is not only unfair but also failure-prone. Furthermore, 
the government intervention in the market results in resource 
misallocation, unhealthy government–business collusions, political 
corruption, and rent-seeking behavior by subsidized companies or 
industries. Therefore, market-oriented mainstream economics does 
not recommend government interference in the market through such 
means as industrial policies. Although the pro-government school 
argues that the government can improve market outcomes through 
industrial policies, it is not gaining considerable approval. Moreover, 
nearly every country in the world is implementing industrial policies in 
various forms—despite differences in the name of the policies or in the 
degree of interference—without exception but not many countries have 
managed such policies successfully. Hence, the controversy continues 
without any conclusion. Nevertheless, the success of the SMU may 
possibly answer this heated dispute.
Korea has one of the few successful cases of industrial policy in the 
last century. As a rural development policy similar to industrial policy, 
the SMU can be considered a success. What type of general success 
factors of government development policy could be drawn from this 
particular case? The SMU provides important lessons with respect to 
industrial policies, as discussed as follows.
First, the principle of ED, which provides differential support 
according to actual market performance, should be constantly re-
implemented on a regular basis in every market cycle. Support should 
not be continued for the reason that a certain company was selected 
once. Companies to be supported should be always newly selected by 
re-evaluating their performance whenever appropriate (every year or six 
months) to prevent rent-seeking behavior and induce all market players 
to concentrate on competition and provide them the motivation to grow. 
The SMU and the Saemaul factory promotion policy allowed every village 
to compete for self-help, bringing them out to market competition by re-
selecting those to be supported on a regular basis through performance 
reevaluation. Second, the evaluation criteria should be based on the 
actual achievements of the company rather than vague standards, 
such as future growth potential, for a transparent and acceptable 
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evaluation. Future growth potential is important but cannot be ensured 
and can only be predicted with the current performance. In the case of 
corporations, actual revenue or profit can be an adequate criterion. The 
possibility of political interference or manipulation can be minimized 
when evaluation criteria are based on such transparent records. Hence, 
the issue of “picking the winner” is no longer controversial by switching 
it with selecting the present market winner. Third, such policy process 
should be legislated into a transparent rule and strictly implemented 
without any exceptions. Fourth, performance evaluation should be fair, 
which will make the results acceptable to everyone. 
Such “discriminatory support policy according to performance” can 
guarantee the fiscal sustainability of the government public policy in 
general, as well as industrial policies, by motivating the subsidized 
companies and individuals to work hard for success, thereby lowering 
or eliminating the necessity for continual government support, as 
discussed in the following section.
B. Sustainability Principle of Government Public Policy
Nowadays, many countries worldwide are suffering due to the lack 
of sustainability in their government public policy. Welfare and social 
policies are poorly managed and are becoming a serious burden on 
governments’ finances, thereby threatening the sustainability of such 
policies. However, Korea’s SMU is a groundbreaking case, in which 
a social (reform) policy also functioned as an economic development 
policy, thereby achieving ideological reform and income boost and 
eventually enhancing the sustainability of social policy by relieving 
the government of its financial burden. Although the SMU started as 
a social policy, the above results were made possible by inducing the 
development of rural villages and contributing to economic development. 
In other words, the SMU had served two ends, that is, social reform and 
economic development.
Economics views economic and social policies in a different angle. 
Economic policies should place importance on the achievements made 
from the support given to gain economic efficiency, whereas social 
policies have greater significance in securing the income of those who 
are in need of support. In such perspective, social policy would have 
difficulties in becoming sustainable by itself because it cannot supply 
the necessary resources indefinitely unless the number of those who 
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are in need continues to decrease. This problem is encountered in social 
policies of most countries these days. However, the SMU halved the 
necessity of the government support for social policy by promoting self-
reliance through ideological reform and the resulting income boost. 
The success of the SMU was made possible because the government 
could turn social policy into an economic development policy by strictly 
applying the ED principle of “providing support to high performers 
and not supporting low performers” or “supporting self-helping villages 
and not supporting villages that do not help themselves” even in 
implementing social policies. President Park Chung Hee’s classification 
of villages into 1st (basic villages), 2nd (self-help villages), and 3rd grades 
(self-reliant villages) and providing support only to 2nd and 3rd graders 
was the driving force behind the change of social policy into an 
economic development policy. The case of the SMU reveals that even 
social policy can be switched to an economic development policy by 
applying the ED principle. 
This reference can be helpful to the reform of social and/or welfare 
policies in many countries globally. If one agrees that the eventual goal 
of social policies is to bring the weak and vulnerable in the shades 
out to the light, then the ED principle of the SMU can be the optimal 
social development policy principle. The policy principle of “those who 
help themselves are treated better” can save the welfare policies of 
the world from collapsing. Moreover, a discrimination policy, such as 
that implemented in the SMU, will be helpful at a time when populist 
democracy is running rampant and economic development policies that 
should be “rewarding high performers” are degenerating into egalitarian 
or social policies that “ignore performance.” 
C.  Principle of Creating a Development friendly Culture, Ideology, and 
Tradition
Economic development begins from the development friendly ideology 
of “self-help spirit.” The SMU transformed the seemingly hopeless 
rural community of Korea into a society ignited with self-help spirit. 
This phenomenon was made possible by President Park Chung Hee’s 
discrimination strategy of “supporting only those villages which help 
themselves.”
Then, what is the general lesson that we could learn from the SMU? 
First of all, institutions and policies (the rules of the game) that prefer 
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self-helping people should be introduced and strictly implemented. The 
rules of the game work as the society’s incentive structure. Therefore, a 
behavioral change can naturally occur only if an incentive system that 
favors self-helping behavior is strictly and continuously implemented, 
thereby making people accustomed to the self-help behavior and 
pertinent spirit. Campaigns and education are insufficient for the 
change. Coercion cannot be the answer either because it may change 
formalities but not the substance. In the end, economic institution 
and policies, which embody the incentive structure favoring the self-
help spirit, should be adopted and be allowed to let people naturally 
adjust to and comply with. By eventually becoming accustomed to such 
policies, people’s self-help behavior would become part of the culture. 
This case was true for the SMU reform.
Unfortunately, the present Korean society seems to have been 
degenerating into an anti-self-help society who blames the government, 
society, and other people for their misfortune. The legal system and 
policy culture of the Korean society (i.e., the rules of the game and 
the ensuing incentive structure) have changed to those that provide 
approval and preference to people with anti-self-helping behavior. 
This change occurred because the SMU or the agricultural support 
policy after political democratization since the late 1980s turned to a 
strategy that “approves and prefers low performance” and discarded 
the ED strategy. The present-day Korean society is a “society in which 
discussing self-help is mocked at.” 
A self-helping society can come into being only if a system that 
provides proper treatment to self-helping behavior is established and is 
continuously implemented, which is the lesson of the SMU.
D. Importance of Leadership of ED
Whether to adopt the ED strategy of “rewarding high performance 
and penalizing low performance” as the governing principle of the 
country ultimately depends on the leadership of the country. History 
shows that the leadership that embraced such strategy reaped success, 
whereas that, which “tolerated and privileged low performance,” pulled 
the country into stagnation albeit it may have enjoyed popularity at the 
moment. 
Former President Park Chung Hee’s decision to reject the suggestion 
of cabinet members and influential politicians and provide support on 
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a discriminatory basis in the second round and thereafter serves as a 
good lesson to all political leaders in the world regarding leadership. 
None other than President Park—who refused to provide populist 
subsidies and decided to provide discriminatory support, in other 
words, who economized politics—can be the epitome of discriminatory 
leadership. The entire process of the SMU as well as Korea’s remarkable 
economic development in the Park’s Era was the vivid demonstration of 
such discriminatory leadership.
E.  SMU as a “Marketization Movement of the Economy” via Government-
led ED
The supposed marketization process, that is, awakening a dormant 
rural society and incorporating it into a capitalist market, is a necessary 
step for underdeveloped countries that pursue industrialization or 
those in transition from a socialist to a capitalist economy. However, 
mainstream economics has yet to elucidate the success strategy of 
marketization. Although it insists that institutionalizing private property 
rights and promoting economic freedom, which are the pillars of the 
capitalist economy, are urgent tasks to be accomplished, there exist 
neither many successful cases of industrialization in the Post-WWII 
Era nor dynamic economic development amongst transition economies 
except for China which, however, has not been faithful to mainstream 
policy advices. Economic institutions are the rules of the game working 
as the incentive system for the society. The private property right and 
the economic freedom are the rules of the game, which guarantees one’s 
right to possess and inherit property that is earned through personal 
effort. Then, why is it the case that people do not immediately change 
and go for profit maximization even after the introduction of this 
system? In other words, why do people not rush in the competition for 
wealth despite the introduction of the necessary market system? The 
reason is people who have been complacent about the rules of the past 
are trapped in path dependence, thereby unwilling to move forward 
regardless of the new rules. The incentive for change is not that strong 
for them due to the force of habit. Thus, the rural villages in Korea were 
left helpless for 20 years before the SMU, although they were equipped 
with most of the devices needed for the market system. The same 
goes for the people of a transition economy. Although they have been 
incorporated into capitalism for longer than 20 years, they seem to be 
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still caught in the socialist ideology.
What is the way to overcome path dependence and activate the 
market spirit? In other words, what is the approach to stimulate 
marketization? The success factors of the SMU are the answer to this 
question. First, the market is an incentive mechanism of inducing 
people to set out on the highly competitive path for growth and success 
by increasing the pressure of being lagged behind via ED. The essence 
of the market is motivation through discrimination on the basis 
of performance, thereby promoting competition for success. As an 
incentive system, the private property right and the economic freedom 
are useful for the development of a capitalist market economy due to 
their function of amplifying potential economic difference and inequality 
based on market performances. However, such market system fails to 
trigger economic take-off despite its long-term presence because the 
market discrimination function is not sufficiently strong due to market 
imperfection. What activated the rules of competition with strong 
discrimination effects in Korea was the government-led SMU, that is, 
the government-led ED, which is already acknowledged as consistent 
with the incentive structure of the gain and loss framing in behavioral 
economics. 
The actual worth of the SMU is the nationwide drive it created 
towards market competition among villages and people (villagers). 
The SMU brought them into marketization and competition possibly 
without anybody being aware of it by creating the rules of the game 
according to ED principle of the market and inducing the participation 
of all people. As competition was promoted and excellent results were 
produced with the SMU, the discrimination function of the market was 
naturally inscribed on people’s minds, thereby providing momentum 
to the economy’s marketization and becoming the basis of Korea’s 
unprecedented economic development. Hence, the SMU is the epitome 
of “the marketization movement,” which may be a necessary step 
for developing countries, countries with transition economies, and 
especially North Korea to catch up, the pragmatic answer to which is 
difficult to find in mainstream economics. The SMU also has useful 
implications for developed countries, which have to be re-marketized 
because their market spirit become increasingly dormant after a long 
period of an egalitarian political economy system, including revised 
capitalism and social democracy.
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F.  SMU: An Alternative or Complement to Existing Community Development 
Models
The success of the SMU has important implications for the community 
development model. Two different approaches of this model exist 
in the literature; one is an external approach and the other an 
internal approach. The former emphasizes the central role of external 
assistance, whereas the latter approach focuses on the resources within 
a community. 
The external approach, which is a need-based approach, attempts 
to identify problems within a community and then to seek external 
resources to solve them. However, this approach produces serious 
negative consequences, such as ruining the self-help spirit of 
community members as they depend on external assistance. Meanwhile, 
the internal approach emphasizes various forms of internal community 
resources, such as individual and community talent, skills, and even 
social relationships as the source of community development. This 
approach is referred to as asset-based community development (ABCD) 
(Kretzmann and McKnight 1993; UN-HABITAT 2008; Stoltenberg 2015). 
It argues that a community can actively promote the development 
process by themselves through utilizing internal assets. While this 
approach identifies what should be done in stepwise in implementing 
ABCD such as mapping the assets and capacities in the community, 
mapping the core groups or organizations to work together, setting 
the vision and goals to target on, leveraging additional resources and 
activities from outside and so on, it lacks an incentive structure to 
generate self-help spirit among the community members, as well as 
leaders.
Both approaches may be complementary because for community 
development one has to identify the community needs as well as to map 
the community’s assets and capacities to meet the needs. However, 
whether to take the need-based and the asset-based approaches, 
holistically or alternatively, the normative statement of what steps 
need to be taken may be one thing but the positive policy question of 
how to motivate community and its members to organize and utilize 
most efficiently those assets and capacities for their own needs in the 
spontaneous, community-driven way is another thing. Generally, the 
existing community development models fail to provide a strategy to 
create self-help spirit, which transforms the development process to 
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a built-in spontaneous, community-driven process and motivates the 
involvement of not only the entire community but also all communities 
in the country. In this regard, the SMU provides an entirely new but 
necessary complementary perspective to the existing models. The 
strategy of ED adopted in the SMU helped create the self-help spirit, 
thereby transforming the SMU into a community-driven process and 
motivating voluntary participation of all villages, which is the key 
lesson to be learned by any community development models. In sum, 
the differential performance-based incentives can help transform 
community development programs into a spontaneous rivalry game 
with voluntary participation of all villages or communities in the 
country.
Recently, community capacity-building programs, such as teaching 
how to fish instead of catching fish for them, have been emphasized. 
However, the lessons of Korea’s SMU imply that such programs may 
not be sufficient to wake up a dormant community. Knowing how 
to fish does not necessarily mean being a productive fisherman, or 
even worse, going fishing. A more relevant question may be how to 
drive the fisherman to fish in the sea or lake and not go on a picnic 
on the mountain with a fishing rod on the shoulder, in addition to 
teaching how to fish. Creating an appropriate incentive structure for 
generating a strong rivalry among fishing villages seems necessary 
for the government or any outside donors. A “fishing contest” may be 
introduced among all villages for the concerned region or for the entire 
country. The game should be played based on the ED principle, in 
which better performers are given more public recognition and reward. 
It should also be replayed on a regular basis, with the performance 
ranking being always open to change, which is the necessary condition 
for creating the self-help spirit and rivalry among villages on a continual 
basis without creating rent-seeking or moral hazard behavior. Let 
the players be all villages that compete among themselves and then 
discriminate them based on their performances. This strategy can help 
create a national community development game for the entire country. 
However, recently, a new approach, which helps rebuild some model 
villages and hope to be emulated by others, is becoming popular.24 
24 This new approach is Professor Jeffrey Sachs’ UN Millennium Village 
Project.
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From the SMU perspective, this approach only has a slim chance to 
succeed because it provides no strong incentive for others to emulate 
the model villages voluntarily and actively; thus, the game will face 
serious moral hazard problem on the part of villages. In this regard, 
the SMU experience can guide and supplement the existing models of 
community development.
VIII. Summary and Concluding Remarks
Korea’s SMU has been regarded as one of the most successful 
socioeconomic development policies in the country’s developmental era. 
During a period that was shorter than a decade, Korea’s rural villages, 
who were seen as blameful of others for their misfortune and hopeless 
of development, had turned around to adopt self-help principle and 
become dynamic with the SMU, eventually surpassing the urban cities 
in average household income. However, a theory on the reasons for 
this phenomenon and the main implications for economic development 
theory and policies have not been well understood yet, which might be 
the reason why few successful replicas of the SMU have been observed 
despite the efforts by many developing economies to learn from it. 
This study argues that the key success factor for Korea’s SMU lies 
in the “government-led ED policy,” which reinforced the market’s 
ED function by exercising the fundamental principle of economic 
development (i.e., the principle of “good performances should be 
rewarded, whereas poor performances should be penalized”). The former 
President Park Chung Hee consistently favored the better-performing 
self-help and self-reliant villages to the basic under-performing villages. 
He made the ED policy as a rule during his entire 18 years as the 
nation’s leader and had strictly enforced it in implementing the SMU. 
This ED policy, which was based on the actual performances with 
the SMU projects, provided a strong incentive and motivation for self-
improvement and development on the part of the villages and led all of 
them (approximately 34,000 villages in Korea) to escape from the status 
of being basic villages (the village category without any development 
achievements) in only 8 years. In addition, President Park worked 
hard to protect the discrimination policy from political influences, 
preventing it from being distorted for political purposes. He consistently 
placed political purposes at a lower priority, below the goal of economic 
development, thereby successfully achieving “an economization of 
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politics” not only for the SMU but also for other developmental policies. 
His efforts to depoliticize the socioeconomic policy paved the road for 
successful implementation of ED policies in general. In this regard, 
the empirical analysis on the effect of the SMU on Korea’s economic 
growth confirms that the SMU became the significant contributor to the 
miraculous growth during the Park Chung Hee Era of economization of 
politics during 1970s (but not during the Post-Park Era of politicization 
of economy). 
In addition, the organizational structure of the SMU turns out 
to be consistent with the general theory of economic development. 
Designating an entire village as an economic organization to work as a 
unit of competition in the SMU helped minimize the potential market 
failure; such failure could have stemmed from high transaction costs 
incurred if the consensus building and decision making for the SMU 
were left to the opportunistic behavior of unorganized individual 
villagers. In this regard, the SMU organizational structure, which 
is consistent with the framework of the holy trinity of economic 
development, market, corporate organization, and government working 
under the ED principle, should be regarded as one of the key features 
for the success of the SMU.
A few important implications for economic development theory and 
policies can be summarized as follows. First, the key success principle 
of government socioeconomic policies for economic development, 
including industrial policies, is ED, which posits that “on the basis 
of market performance, success should be rewarded, whereas failure 
should be penalized.” Second, even social policies inclusive of welfare 
policy, as well as social empowerment policy, can be transformed 
into a growth and development policy if the ED principle is adopted 
in the policy implementation process as an incentive and motivation 
mechanism. This lesson may help save the current downward spiral 
of social welfare and empowerment policies around the world, which 
are based on egalitarian support systems and undermine the incentive 
to grow and develop. Third, if any country wants to change people’s 
mindset regarding their self-help spirit for development, it should 
adopt the ED principle of “helping those who help themselves” into the 
socioeconomic institutions and policies. Fourth, a political leadership 
which has a good understanding of ED principle and is determined 
to implement and protect it from political distortion is a precondition 
for successful economic development. Fifth, this study argues that 
234 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
the SMU worked as a mechanism to expedite the marketization of the 
Korean rural economy by allowing every village, as well as villagers, 
to be involved in the competitive game under the rule of ED. This 
mechanism could be usefully emulated by countries with developing 
economies that seek marketization of the economy for development, 
including North Korea. It could also help the developed countries under 
economic stagnation reverse their slide into anti-ED egalitarian regimes 
and revive their growth dynamism. Sixth, the experience of Korean SMU 
provides an important alternative or complementary perspective to the 
existing community development models. 
In conclusion, although accounting the success of the SMU with 
only a single factor seems presumptuous, Park Chung Hee’s ED policy 
of providing exclusive support to “self-helping” villages is the most 
important and necessary part of Korea’s success story. This occurrence 
is consistent with the basic principles of economic development as 
expounded by Jwa (2017a, 2017b, 2018). Stated differently, ED is a 
theory of the SMU success.
All in all, the SMU should certainly not be regarded as something of 
the past to be archived into the cabinets of history. The success of the 
SMU is now increasingly being recognized globally, and a number of 
countries and regional institutions have adopted the SMU as a base 
model for rural development. The SMU has now been utilized by more 
than 70 countries.
With the Economics Nobel Prize having been recently awarded to 
Richard Thaler for his work on behavioral economics,25 we could re-
emphasize that Park Chung Hee’s SMU implemented the idea of 
“gain framing” and “loss framing,” in which loss framing is discovered 
as generally more powerful in driving behavior. The SMU awarded 
positive reward to better-performing villages, which corresponds to 
gain framing (helping those who help themselves) while leaving out the 
non-performers from SMU support—such loss framing (leaving out the 
underperforming villages) spoke volumes to all villages. 
Hopefully, the relevance and lessons of Korea’s SMU and the 
developmental strategy under Park Chung Hee continue to be widely 
acknowledged and adopted in the years to come, in which ED would 
provide for the future progress of our collective livelihood.
25 See Thaler and Sunstein (2008).
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